Accident Investigation Board of Finland - Report B 2-2010 R

On Thursday 25 February 2010 at 12:42, a fatal level-crossing accident occurred in Pori on the level crossing at the intersection of Tattaritie and the Mäntyluoto-Pori railway line. The driver of the train noticed that a passenger car was approaching the crossing from the right and gave a warning signal. It then became apparent to the driver of the train that the passenger car was not going to stop and the driver of the train put on the emergency brakes. The train ran into the left side of the car, the car jammed into the locomotive and the locomotive forced the car forward for 304 metres until the train came to a halt. The right buffer of the train penetrated the left side window of the car. The driver of the car died immediately from head and chest injuries. A car passenger died later in hospital from head and chest injuries.
The accident occurred because the driver of the car failed to notice the approaching train in time and was no longer able to stop or otherwise prevent the collision. Factors contributing to this were:
The crossing was familiar to the driver of the car, which is a factor that generally reduces vigilance. The driver had also driven across the level crossing in the other direction moments before the accident.
The level crossing was not equipped with warning installations.
The level crossing was not equipped with proper waiting platforms and the road rises before the crossing to such an extent that drivers tend to avoid stopping before the crossing, especially in wet or slippery conditions.
The car had tyres designated for summertime use.
For the 30 metre stretch before the level crossing, the road had two intersections with give way signs.
In order to prevent similar accidents the investigation commission recommends the removal of the Tattari level crossing and the building of an alternative route via the residential area through a protected level crossing nearby. This would direct some traffic along a route that does not require a track crossing.
Identifying the location of the accident was not problematic because the location was familiar to the driver of the train, the traffic controller and the emergency response centre operator. The driver of the train made a direct call to the emergency response centre.
With the aim of making this practice the standard response, the investigation commission reiterates recommendation S211 of investigation report B1/2005R and B1/2009R: That the instructions concerning the placing of emergency alarm calls be developed in such a manner that in all cases in which urgent rescue service assistance is required, a call be made to the general emergency number from the accident site in addition to the notification to traffic control.

Accident Investigation Board of Finland - Report C 1/2000 R

On Wednesday 16 February 2000, a tank wagon derailed in a level crossing on Tampere Depot yard. The front bogie of the wagon - as seen in its running direction - derailed. No damage to the rolling stock was discovered as a result of the incident; the wagon remained in an upright position with no leaks detected therein.
The incident was caused by the level crossing being covered by thick ice as a result of rain water having frozen thereon and road vehicles having travelled on the ice and packed it. The rails were in fact in the ice layer and the wheels of the wagon in question rose on the ice and thereby caused the derailment of the bogie.
In order to prevent corresponding incidents in the future, the Accident Investigation Board of Fin- land recommends that the condition of the level crossing always be checked prior to the transfer of wagons to their unloading site.

Accident Investigation Board of Finland - Report C 1/1997 R

On January 16, 1997, on Rauma railway yard, a member of a train crew fell from a footstep of a freight wagon and was severely injured when run over by a wheel of the wagon. One leg below the knee and the toes of the other leg were squeezed between the rail and the wheel.
The accident was caused by the footstep being slippery. Therefore the feet of the train crew- member slipped, and he fell on the track.
As a result of the accident, the train crew member lost his left leg below the knee and the toes up to the first joints of the right leg. The costs generated by the accident totalled over FIM 300,000.
In order to prevent such accidents in the future, the Accident Investigation Board of Finland recommends the footsteps to be made of some other material.

Accident Investigation Board of Finland - Report C 20/1996 R

A work-machine unit pulled by a service railcar ran trough a rail barrier at Ylöjärvi, close to Tampere, on Friday, November 8, 1996. Five wagons and track equipment were damaged. The accident did not generate any major troubles for railway traffic. The accident was caused by inadequate operation of the brakes.

Accident Investigation Board of Finland - Report B6/2010R

On Wednesday 23 June 2010 at 3.44pm, an accident involving a freight train and a timber-carrying articulated vehicle occurred at a half-barrier equipped level crossing in the Kyrö area of Pöytyä municipality. The timber-carrying articulated vehicle started to manoeuvre past the half barriers, which were in the lowered position, when the freight train, which had departed from Kyrö railway yard in the direction of Tampere, collided with articulated vehicle's trailer.

There were no serious personal injuries. Both locomotives of the train were derailed and the front and chassis of the frontmost locomotive was damaged. The articulated vehicle's trailer was damaged beyond repair. The barrier installations of the level crossing were also severely damaged. The repair costs arising from the damage to track equipment and the level crossing amounted to EUR 150,000.

The accident occurred because the articulated vehicle started to manoeuvre past the lowered half barriers, as a result of which the train collided with the vehicle's trailer.

The decision by the vehicle driver to start manoeuvring past the barriers was apparently influenced by the pressure resulting from being in a queue. The driver felt pressure building because the long wait in the queue put extra burden on schedules and also because the driver felt that the articulated vehicle was blocking the pedestrian crossing and partly also access to a nearby store. The decision to proceed was probably also made in part because other drivers were manoeuvring past the barriers, which gave confirmation to the notion that the barrier installations were not functioning properly.

The queues grew to a significant size while the barriers were lowered for too long because the engine driver did not give due regard to the signal and therefore did not notice that the remote controller had given permission to depart. Lack of formal communication between the remote controller and the engine driver led to a misunderstanding and the train did not depart as soon as permission was given. Once the alarm had been issued that the barriers had been lowered too long time, the remote controller failed to contact the engine driver or take any other action to ease the queue at the level crossing before the departure of the train.

Several studies and plans have been initiated from 1996 onwards with regard to improve safety at the Kyrö level crossing. These plans have focused on building an underpass at the Kyrö level crossing or equipping it with double barriers. The investigation commission is not issuing new recommendations but rather notes that an underpass should be built as soon as possible in order to solve the traffic problems now encountered at the crossing.

Accident Investigation Board of Finland - Report B5/2010R

On Sunday 16 May 2010 at 7.57 pm, an Sr2 electric locomotive en route from Rauma to Tampere collided with a car at the Koskinen unprotected level crossing in Kokemäki. The accident was fatal to the car driver and a passenger. A second passenger was slightly injured. The car was wrecked beyond repair and the front of the locomotive suffered minor damage.

The accident occurred because the car driver noticed the approaching train too late and despite braking was not able to stop the car before the level crossing. As the car approached the track the driver was driving too fast in relation to how visible the track was from the road. Contributing to this were the inexperience of the driver and the fact that there was little indication that a level crossing was approaching: there were no warning installations, and there was a curving road before the crossing and a level crossing sign pointing in the wrong direction. Underlying factor to the accident  was also that visibility to the track was poor when approaching and insufficient sightline towards the approaching train made the observation more difficult. The evening sun was shining low on the horizon from the direction of the approaching train.

The investigation commission is not issuing any safety recommendations as a result of the accident, but states that sightlines at the crossing should immediately be cleared in such a way that they meet regulations. In addition, the party responsible for road maintenance should reduce the speed limit to 20 km/h in the vicinity of the crossing, place warning signs on the road before the crossing and also place relevant STOP signs at the crossing. The Finnish Transport Agency should take effective action to ensure that road maintenance staff are sufficiently aware of proper level crossing maintenance as well as the installation of the relevant warning signs.

Actions leading to safety improvement were completed in the surrounding area following another accident in 2004, namely the number of level crossings in the area was reduced and traffic was redirected to the Koskinen level crossing. Redirecting traffic is generally a good solution but it also necessarily increases traffic at other level crossings, and therefore such actions should also include the equipment of remaining level crossings with appropriate half-barrier installations.

The investigation commission also notes that there was uncertainty as to which party was re-sponsible for level crossing maintenance and the clearing of sightlines.

Accident Investigation Board of Finland - Report B4/2010R

On Monday 26 April 2010 at 5:10 pm, a commuter train was derailed in Helsinki at a turnout. The train was approaching track 6 at Helsinki station when a turnout along the route turned underneath the train causing the train to be derailed. The rearmost unit of the three-unit train derailed and collided with a catenary support, with the result that the portal fell on the train’s roof causing extensive power outage at Helsinki railway yard. The derailed unit was damaged and there was also damage to track equipment. There were no personal injuries.

The cause of the derailment was that the turnout turned underneath the train. This was due to emergency commands issued from the signal box control. The traffic controller issued the commands to a turnout other than the one intended. Contributing to this was the fact that insulated track  section faults had been common at Helsinki railway yard. Due to these faults, traffic control was using shunting routes for which emergency commands could be issued. This had become almost  daily practice.  Methods with stripped security were being used so as not to disturb the flow of traffic.  Partly contributing to the accident was the fact that the traffic controller had very little experience with the task.

In order to prevent the occurrence of similar accidents, the investigation commission recommends that the party responsible for the upkeep of the track should systematically monitor and, when required, improve track maintenance and techniques for determining track availability so that security is not unnecessarily compromised. In addition, the commission recommends that traffic control job rotation should ensure that demanding posts are familiar to traffic controllers by means of training and sufficient task rotation. With regard to training in the identification and handling of disturbances, and response procedures relating to them, special attention should be given to practices that do not compromise safety.

It became apparent during the investigation that information about disturbances experienced by traffic control is forwarded to maintenance, but not to parties responsible for safety.  The keeper of the track and the contractor responsible for track maintenance did not fully recognise the significance of the insulation faults for traffic control, and the controllers had become used to them.  For this reason, the commission proposes that, in order to prevent similar situations, the parties responsible for rail traffic should improve their information exchange. It should be better monitored  that exceptional procedures do not become established practice.

Accident Investigation Board of Finland - Report C2/2010R

On Tuesday, 24 March 2010, at 1:12pm, three unloaded Finnish freight train cars derailed in the Peltola section of the Joensuu railway yard. The derailment occurred when freight train 4719 left from Joensuu for Uimaharju on track 061 while two stop blocks had been left in place at the front wheel sets of the two rearmost wagons of the train. The front end of the train’s second wagon from the rear was derailed immediately when the train started moving. The train's rearmost wagon and the rear end of the third wagon from the rear were derailed when the stop blocks became blocked in a turnout crossing. The switchman at the southern end of the railway yard heard the rumble emanating from the train and detected that the three rearmost wagons were not running on track. The switcher requested, via the railway yard radio, that the traffic controller stop the train, and the controller ordered the engine driver to stop the train.

The accident damaged track over a distance of 700 metres when the derailed wagons caused damage to the sleepers and electrical cables underground. Furthermore, four turnouts were damaged in the accident and also a electric pole of railways was damaged when a derailed wagon collided with it. The accident disturbed other railway traffic for four hours. The passenger trains were replaced with bus transport during the disturbance. The total cost of the accident was 10,000 €.

Accident Investigation Board of Finland - Report B2/2010R

On Thursday 25 February 2010 at 12:42, a fatal level-crossing accident occurred in Pori on the level crossing at the intersection of Tattaritie and the Mäntyluoto-Pori railway line. The driver of the train noticed that a passenger car was approaching the crossing from the right and gave a warning signal. It then became apparent to the driver of the train that the passenger car was not going to stop and the driver of the train put on the emergency brakes. The train ran into the left side of the car, the car jammed into the locomotive and the locomotive forced the car forward for 304 metres until the train came to a halt. The right buffer of the train penetrated the left side window of the car. The driver of the car died immediately from head and chest injuries. A car pas-senger died later in hospital from head and chest injuries.

Accident Investigation Board of Finland - Report C1/2010R

On Friday, 19 February 2010, five tank wagons pushed by a shunting unit bumped against a railbarrier stop on track 204 at the Neste Oil Oyj unloading terminal in Kilpilahti, Finland. The first
barrier wagon fell down the embankment, hitting a gas pipeline at the bottom. The second protection wagon came to a stop at the edge of the embankment, and the three Russian wagons behind it, containing industrial gasoline, were derailed. Neither the gas pipeline nor the wagons suffered any leaks. The wagons containing industrial gasoline had to be emptied before clearance work could begin.

The immediate cause of the accident was the shunting foreman’s failure to escort the wagons all the way. He was under the impression that there was enough room for the wagons on the track. The shunting foreman’s activities were influenced by the following factors:

 While trying to disengage the brakes, the conditions for the shunting foreman were
hot. They were then cold during the long (3 km) pushing movement
 It was the foreman’s third night shift in a row and he was very tired
 It was the foreman’s first shift as an independent shunting foreman at Kilpilahti
 The shunting foreman had not received sufficient training to act as a shunting foreman at the unloading terminal.

To avoid similar accidents in the future, the Accident Investigation Board recommends that long and heavy rows of wagons should be pulled into the unloading terminal in Kilpilahti. It is further recommended that work orientation be carried out such that the person receiving orientation training accompanies the shunting unit as an additional crew member. This would enable the person receiving the orientation training to familiarise him or herself with the duties of a shunting foreman. An orientation plan and an orientation training card should also be provided.

Accident Investigation Board of Finland - Report B1/2010R

At 8:28am on Monday, 4 January 2010, four passenger cars that had become separated from a train collided with a rail barrier at the end of the track at the Helsinki Central Railway Station at a speed of approximately 35 km/h. The front end of the double-decker coach that was the first in the train was pushed onto the damaged rail barrier and then the concrete buffer stop at the end of the track, eventually hitting the wall of the office building at the end of the track. The car broke the wall and came to a stop partially inside the building. Pushed by a locomotive, the train was being shunted to its departure track at the Helsinki station from the Ilmala depot, 4.5 kilometres away. The security officers at the station managed to evacuate the people from the platform before the collision.

Of the three people in the cars during the collision, one was slightly injured. Having collided first with the rail barrier and then the wall of the office building, the double-decker coach was so badly damaged that it had to be scrapped. The second, third, and fourth cars in the train suffered minor damage. In the fifth car, a 1,500-volt cable and a UIC cable were broken, and a brake conduit came  loose. The other cars were undamaged. The rail barrier at the end of the track was completely crushed, and the concrete buffer stop behind it suffered minor fractures in the corners. The horizontal end beam to which the contact wires are attached was torn off. The office building suffered substantial material damage. The load-bearing primary frame of the building did not suffer significant damage, but the hollow-core slabs were fractured, and they also moved slightly. A meeting room in the impact area on the second floor of the building was completely destroyed, and the street-level entrance suffered substantial damage. Additionally, the building maintenance and safety-technology-related systems in the immediate vicinity of the impact area were damaged. The total costs of the damage amounted to € 825 000.

Accident Investigation Board of Finland - Report B9/2009R

On Wednesday 16 December 2009 at 13:26 p.m., a fatal level crossing accident occurred on the Lemettilä unprotected level crossing in Laukaa municipality. The accident occurred when a van with a couple inside drove in front of a freight train en route from Jyväskylä to Aänekoski. The van’s driver and passenger died immediately from the injuries received. The damage caused by the accident to rolling stock amounted to € 1,300.

The cause of the accident was that the van driver drove onto the level crossing without apparently observing the train approaching from the right. A contributing factor was the fact that, when approached, the crossing looks safe, rendered observation more difficult. Special care should have been exercised, however, considering that the road slopes downwards before the level crossing, that there is a road crossing close to the level crossing and that the sun was shining directly towards the approaching van.

In order to prevent similar accidents, the investigation commission recommends the removal of the Lemettilä unprotected level crossing. Alternatively, the level crossing should be equipped with a half-barrier installation.

Accident Investigation Board of Finland - Report B8/2009R

On Thursday 3 December 2009 at 4.05 a.m., a fatal level crossing accident occurred at the Teppo level crossing in Seinäjoki. The level crossing was equipped with half barriers. A passenger train en route to Helsinki collided with a car which was at a halt on the crossing. The collision caused immediate to the car driver.

The cause of the accident lay in the train colliding with the car, which had come to a halt on the crossing. Due to issues that became apparent during the investigation, the investigation commission will not issue any recommendations as a result of the accident.

Accident Investigation Board of Finland - Report C4/2009R

At 12:29pm on Thursday, 1 October 2009, an incident occurred at the Koria station on the Lahti– Kouvola section of line, when a passenger train ended up on the wrong track in front of a freight train.

Several sub-projects relating to the Lahti–Luumäki–Vainikkala construction project were under-way on the Lahti–Kouvola section of line. With regard to the Koria station, work was in progress relating to the commissioning of a new signal box to be installed on the Lahti–Kouvola section of line. The Automatic Train Protection (ATP) system was not operational at the Koria station and special arrangements were applied at the station. The signal box of Koria station was manned.

A freight train arriving from the direction of Lahti had stopped on the southbound track, to the west of the Koria station. The incident occurred when a passenger train, arriving from the direc-tion of Kouvola along the northbound track and passing through the turnouts near the western end of the Koria station, entered the southbound track in front of the freight train. The engine driver of the passenger train noticed the danger in time and managed to stop the train 200 metres ahead of the locomotive of the freight train.

The immediate cause of this incident was the transverse route set for freight train ahead of the passenger train by the traffic controller. The traffic controller’s situation awareness was not up to date, as a result of which his perception of the location of the passenger train was incorrect.

The situation arose due to signal E being inoperative. The signal box was not used to secure all routes.

Another contributing factor lay in a feature of the signal box, which enables the turnouts on the route being set to turn even if one or more of the track sections directly connected to the turnouts is occupied. Furthermore, the signal box in use enabled a ”proceed” signal to be displayed for the freight train.

Unambiguous instructions were not issued for centralised traffic control during the construction work at the Koria operating point. Furthermore, the operating model did not utilise the safety fea-tures of the signal box to the full.

To prevent similar situations from occurring, the investigation commission recommends that safety planning should be enhanced during transitional stages.

Two organisational changes occurred while the investigation was in progress: the Finnish Rail Agency became part of the Transport Safety Agency, while the Finnish Rail Administration was incorporated into the Finnish Transport Agency. The previous names are used throughout the investigation report.

Accident Investigation Board of Finland - Report C3/2009R

On Thursday 17 September 2009 at 13:13 p.m., five Russian pellet-carrying wagons were derailed at Kilpua station on the Oulu-Ylivieska section of line. The derailment occurred at the southern end of the station, when a pellet train en route from Oulu to Kokkola departed from track three towards the main track after giving way to an oncoming train. When the train’s rear section was still on track 3, the train driver felt an abrupt jerk and noticed the brake pipe loosening. The train driver immediately stopped the train and went outside to inspect the situation. Although the last three of the train’s eight wagons were still on the track, five had been derailed. The train had a total of 45 wagons. Being able to disengage the train at the point where the first wagon had derailed, the driver moved the wagons at the front to Oulainen for further inspection. The total costs of the incident amounted to 112,000 euros.

The incident occurred because the heavy pellet train was directed onto a sidetrack which was in poor condition. Due to oncoming traffic, the remote controller was forced to direct the freight train onto Kilpua's track three.

Another factor contributing to the derailment lay in the driver used the electric brakes only after departing from Kilpua. These only affected the locomotives, therefore exerting longitudinal force along the train. Combined with the stiff bogies, of the wagons’ longitudinal force caused the outer rail to give way at a curve, with the result that the wheels on the inside of the curve were derailed.

In order to prevent similar incidents from occurring, the Accident Investigation Board ecommends that the Finnish Transport Agency review the actual condition of station sidetracks and their ability to handle heavy, Russian freight train traffic. The Accident Investigation Board also reiterates its earlier recommendation concerning the condition inspection and greasing of pivots on Russian wagons.

Accident Investigation Board of Finland - Report B7/2009R

On Friday, 17 July 2009, at 9.50am, a level crossing accident took place at the unprotected Rauhalantie level crossing in Loviisa, in which the driver of a car perished after having steered in front of a freight train.

The most probable cause for the accident was the elderly driver’s failure to perceive the approaching
train. Other underlying causative factors in the accident may include the driver’s familiarity with the level crossing and the fact that his physical capabilities were diminished through illnesses and impaired eyesight.

Removing the heavy-traffic Rauhalantie level crossing by constructing a replacing road connection
via the road Seppäläntie has been under consideration in Loviisa at least for the past three decades. Pursuant to the safety strategy on level crossings issued by the Finnish Rail Administration, removal of level crossings is the preferred method of improving their safety; therefore, this solution would comply with the strategy. During the investigation, the Loviisa Town Council decided in connection with discussion of the budget for the 2010 fiscal year not to construct the extension to Seppäläntie but to equip the Rauhalantie level crossing with warning installation instead.

In the investigation, it also emerged that the relevant parties hold divergent views on the duty to clear the sightlines at level crossings. The Investigation Commission recommends that the Ministry of Transport and Communications ensure that such consistent guidelines on the duty to clear the sight lines be issued as are acceptable to all parties.

During the investigation, the Finnish Rail Agency and the Finnish Rail Administration were, from the beginning of 2010, organisationally merged with the Finnish Transport Safety Agency (Trafi) and the Finnish Transport Agency, respectively. In this investigation report, the previous names of the agencies are used.

Accident Investigation Board of Finland - Report B6/2009R

At 11:17 a.m. on Tuesday 14 July 2009, a fatal level crossing accident occurred on the Kotkaniementie unprotected level crossing in Ojakkala in Vihti. The accident occurred when a car travelling along Kotkaniementie road drove without stopping in front of a freight train en route to Riihimäki. A nine-year-old girl in the car was fatally injured. The car was wrecked beyond repair. Damage totalling €6,000 was caused to yhe rolling stock and to the track.

The cause of the accident lay in the car driver’s completely failing to observe the approaching freight train.

Considering that the Kotkaniementie road is busy with domestic and international traffic, and that no other route to the Kotkaniemi area is available, the investigation commission recommends that the Kotkaniemi 1 level crossing be equipped with half-barriers.

Accident Investigation Board of Finland - Report B4/2009R

On Sunday, 24 May 2009, at 2:28 p.m., a fatal level-crossing accident occurred on the Köykäntie unprotected level crossing in Eurajoki. The accident occurred when a car en route from Lapijoki village to the centre of Eurajoki drove onto the level crossing in front of a freight train en route from Rauma to Tampere. The only person in the car was the driver, who died from his injuries despite first aid. Damage caused by the accident to track equipment amounted to some € 5,000.

The accident probably occurred because the driver did not observe that the car, which was equipped with an automatic gearbox, started moving slowly forward as the driver was reaching into the car's right front seat or leg space. This may have been due to the driver searching through a bag or picking one up that had fallen off the seat after braking. The driver had stopped the car ahead of the level crossing, probably due to having noticed the approaching train.

In order to prevent similar accidents, the Investigation Commission recommends that the Köykäntie level crossing be removed. Alternatively, the level crossing should be equipped with a warning installation with half-barriers.

Accident Investigation Board of Finland - Report B3-2009R

At 1:08 p.m. on Saturday 25 April 2009, a level crossing accident occurred in Mustio in Raasepori involving a car and a freight train en route from Kirkniemi to Karjaa. The accident proved fatal to the car driver, while the engine driver escaped uninjured. While the car was wrecked beyond repair, the train sustained only minor damage.

The direct cause of the accident lay in the car’s driving onto the level crossing while the freight
train was approaching simultaneously from the right. It has not been ascertained why the car driver drove onto the level crossing. The following may have played a role in this decision:

•  the car driver did not observe the approaching train, or judged that it would be possible to make the crossing before the train’s arrival
•  the driver accidentally pressed the accelerator instead of the brakes
•  the driver noticed the train but had insufficient time to stop the car before reaching the crossing.

Accident Investigation Board of Finland - Report B2/2009R

On Wednesday, 25 March 2009, a level crossing accident involving a van and a freight train occurred on the Hyvämäki level crossing in Nurmijärvi. The accident was fatal to the van driver. The engine driver, the shunting foreman and two shunters who were on the train came through the accident uninjured. The van was wrecked beyond repair. The train sustained minor damage.

On Wednesday, 25 March 2009, a level crossing accident involving a van and a freight train occurred on the Hyvämäki level crossing in Nurmijärvi. The accident was fatal to the van driver. The engine driver, the shunting foreman and two shunters who were on the train came through the accident uninjured. The van was wrecked beyond repair. The train sustained minor damage.

- the driver was focused on something other than making a safe crossing

- the intermediate wall between the van’s cabin and storage space, and also the absence of windows in the storage space, hindered visibility in the direction of the approaching train.

- the sun shining in the driver’s face blinded him.

Accident Investigation Board of Finland - Report C2/2009R

On Monday, 9 March 2009, at 8:42pm, six domestic wagons were derailed at the Lahti railway yard. The derailment occurred at a turnout, when the 33-wagon freight train had set off from Lahti towards Kouvola. After two and a half minutes, the engine driver felt a strange tugging in the train. The engine driver reduced power, saw an intense flash in the rear-view mirror of the locomotive, and then saw a portal topple and the contact wires falling down. The engine driver immediately stopped the train, using only the direct-acting brakes of the locomotive because of the slow speed. The empty, covered four-axle wagon that was 19th in the train had derailed on the trailing turnout crossing, pulling the next five wagons off the rails.

Traffic on the main tracks in Lahti was badly disrupted, because the toppling of the signal portal caused the contact wires of several tracks to come down. Because of the falling of the north main track’s contact wire, passenger train traffic from the east had to be stopped, and passengers had to be transported to their destinations in other vehicles. The total costs from the accident were EUR 278 000.

The accident was caused by the wheel flanges of the first derailed wagon rising over the ice packed in the flangeway between the crossing frog and the check rail, and further off the rails. As the wagon, which had a light axle weight, arrived at the crossing, its front bogie was turned, by the fully frozen crossing and chunks of ice and snow, far enough to cause the wheel flange to rise over the wingrail, causing the derailment of the wheelset. There were many snow and ice chunks in the vicinity of the turnout crossing, at least some of which had likely fallen from the inner surface of the buffer plate of the locomotive of a departing train.

Accident Investigation Board of Finland - Report B1/2009R

A level crossing accident took place at the unprotected level crossing of Teurastamo on the Mäntyluoto–Pori track and Pikakyläntie road on Wednesday, 11 February 2009, at 3.12 p.m. The engine driver emergency braked 29 metres before the collision, when the car had disappeared from his sight. The locomotive hit the middle of the car’s right side, not being able to reduce speed before the collision. The car clung to the front of the locomotive and travelled in front of it for 223 metres, until the locomotive stopped. Two passengers in the car suffered fatal head injuries in the accident, and the driver was seriously injured. The locomotive suffered minor damage, while the car was wrecked beyond repair.

The accident was caused by the car driver noticing the train too late and not having time to stop or otherwise prevent the accident. Underlying factors for this were:

- The level crossing was familiar to the driver, which in most cases decreases carefulness

- The level crossing did not feature any alarm devices

- The level crossing did not have proper wait platforms and the slope to the crossing was so steep that drivers try to avoid stopping, particularly in slippery conditions

- Visibility to the left was worse than in the direction of the train to the right, and an imbalance such as this tends to increase detection errors in the region of the better-visibility area

- An embankment over a district-heating pipe decreased the visibility of the train

- The car driver was fairly inexperienced, and the day in question was a special festive day related to studying

- Driving on the narrow private road with icy ridges was already occupying the driver's attention.

Accident Investigation Board of Finland - Report C1/2009R

According to a deviation notification a safety problem was encountered in Korvensuo on 30 December 2008. Engine drivers notified that they were receiving restrictive information. A distant signal was indicating stop even though a balise at the previous signal had given to the automatic train protection equipment (ATP) the preliminary information that driving at the fastest speed was permitted (proceed Fsl), and, as the train caught sight of the subsequent main signal, it showed the proceed aspect.

The reasons for the faulty ATP operation was that an outdated card version had been placed in the IM3-module (signal box computer) controlling data transfer between Haarajoki and Korvensuo signal boxes. The wrong flash card had been installed because the software version had not been verified before installing the card. The installers said that this was because verification equipment was not operational due to the transfer of the office to another location. The card had also not been marked sufficiently clearly.

The situation was temporarily fixed once the deviation had become apparent by setting an 80 km/h speed limit in the area. The Thales “Emergency Team” met on 5 January 2009 to analyse the situation. Once the reason for the irregularity was observed, a new flash card was installed in the Haarajoki signal box module on 5 January 2009 at 23.00. The operations were tested and on 7 January 2009 the 80 km/h speed limit was lifted from the area

Accident Investigation Board of Finland - Report C6/2008R

On Monday, 20 October 2008, at 4:46pm, an incident occurred in the Kerava railway yard when an H-marked local train en route from Riihimäki to Helsinki passed an entry signal that was in the stop position and forced open the turnout. The main track’s remote control operator noticed the situation on his monitor and radio-commanded the train to stop. The train stopped on the track section after the turnout. A Pendolino train was simultaneously approaching Kerava from the direction of the Kerava–Lahti direct line. This train was behind schedule. The traffic controller had set a route for it to Kerava's track 2. After this, the traffic controller had set a northward route along Kerava’s track 4 for an R-marked local train approaching Kerava from the south.

At the point when the H train was driven past the entry signal in stop position, the main signal for
 he Pendolino train, and also the main signal at the north end of the Kerava railway yard for the R train, switched from proceed aspect to stop position. The Pendolino train was 1.9 km from the signal, and the R train about 4.6 km from the signal. When the H train reserved the next turnout after the one it had forced open, the main signal reserved for the R train after the platform switched from proceed aspect to stop. At that point, the R train was about 2.8 km from the signal.

Because of ongoing construction work, the automatic train running control (ATC) was not in operation for the Hanala–Järvenpää section and the section was set as a construction area. The train speed limit has been set at 80 km/h in construction areas and the automatic train running control (ATC) only monitors to ensure that this speed is not exceeded.

Accident Investigation Board of Finland - Report B6/2008R

On 25 September 2008 at 4.18 p.m., a level crossing accident leading to two fatalities occurred at the half barrier equipped level crossing of Suurisuo in Iisalmi. The accident occurred when a private car driving slowly westward along Parkatintie road collided with a passenger train en route from Kajaani to Helsinki. The two persons in the car died instantly. The car was wrecked beyond repair. The costs arising from the accident to railway rolling stock and equipment amounted to EUR 30,000.

The direct cause of the accident was that the car driver drove onto the level crossing without stopping. The driver applied the brakes only after the car had driven beneath the lowering barrier and was hit by it, with the result that the car stopped on the track. It is likely that the driver did not
notice the level crossing warning signs or the lowering barriers. Potentially contributory factors possibly included the sun shining in the driver’s face, a worn windshield, the driver’s impaired eyesight, hearing and alertness.

In order to prevent similar accidents, the investigation commission recommends that the red blinking filament lamps of the barriers and warning signs of the Suurisuo level crossing be replaced by blinking or flashing LED lights. Identical replacements should be made at similar level crossings where it has been noted that the sun dazzles the driver when approaching the crossing.

Accident Investigation Board of Finland - Report B5/2008R

At 10.43 a.m. on Tuesday 26 August 2008, a railway work unit en route from Pieksämäki to Suonenjoki collided with a car at an unprotected level crossing in Suonenjoki.

The accident was fatal to the driver of the car. The car was damaged beyond repair and the railway work unit, which was a service railcar, incurred minor damage.

The direct cause of the accident was that the car driver drove onto the level crossing without stopping. In all probability, the driver completely failed to observe the railway work unit approaching from the left. The lack of a proper wait platform, a sharply rising road and limited visibility made it difficult to observe the surroundings and drive the car at the same time.

To prevent the occurrence of similar accidents, the investigation commission recommends that the sightlines of the level crossing be improved and the wait platforms reconditioned to meet regulations, and that the level crossing be equipped with a warning sign. If it becomes apparent that sightlines cannot be improved and that the wait platforms cannot be reconditioned, then the level crossing should be removed or equipped with a half-barrier.

In addition, the investigation commission recommends that the Finnish Rail Administration inform the parties in charge of road maintenance of their obligation to build and maintain road segments leading to level crossings as set out in the relevant regulations. The Finnish Rail Administration should also provide appropriate information on any track changes made and shortcomings discovered during inspection rounds. It is also suggested that the Finnish Rail Administration and
the Ministry of Transport and Communications initiate a nationwide campaign about the obligations of road maintainers with regard to level crossings.

Accident Investigation Board of Finland - Report B4/2008R

At 22.41.40 on Monday 7 July 2008, a van and a train consisting of two locomotives en route from Ylivieska to Iisalmi collided on the Vehkatie unprotected level crossing in Kiuruvesi,  resulting in the death of the van driver. The van was wrecked beyond repair and the locomotive’s front and bogie structures were slightly damaged. The cost of the accident on the railway side was in excess of € 50,00

The direct cause of the accident was that the van driver drove onto the level crossing without stopping. It is probable that the driver noticed the approaching train too late and was unable to avoid the collision. The evening sun was shining low on the horizon from the direction of the approaching train and this may have made observation difficult. It is possible that the driver’s attention was focused on a newly arrived text message or that the driver was looking for the mobile phone. It is also possible that visibility in the direction of the train was blocked by the vehicle's chassis structures, because the vehicle approached the level crossing at an angle to the track.

In order to prevent the occurrence of similar accidents, the investigation commission recommends the removal of the Vehkatie level crossing. Before its removal, the level crossing should be closed by Kiuruvesi town through temporary arrangements. Also, a track speed limit of
70 km/h should be set to run through the crossing until its removal. Furthermore, "No thoroughfare!" signs should be placed without delay on Vehkatie road and the Ratakatu-Kirkkoharjuntie crossing, and heavy vehicles should be prohibited from driving through the level crossing.

In order to ensure the accuracy of level crossing location information, the investigation commission recommends that emergency response centres update the level crossing location data of their ELS systems to match the tasoristeys.fi database, as set out in the relevant regulations.

Accident Investigation Board of Finland - Report B3/2008R

On Wednesday, 25 June 2008, at 4:22.50 pm, a level crossing accident involving a scooter and a rail bus en route from Joensuu to Pieksämäki occurred at the Huikuri level crossing. The accident was fatal to the driver of the scooter. The personnel and passengers of the rail bus remained uninjured. The scooter was wrecked beyond repair. The rail bus incurred damage to its left front
corner and the obstruction clearing device. The repair costs of the rail bus amounted to EUR 1,400.

The direct cause of the accident was that the driver of the scooter drove onto the level crossing without stopping. The driver of the scooter probably did not notice the rail bus at all or saw it too late. Contributing to this were the following factors:

- the level crossing was very close to a highway with substantial traffic

- the driver of the scooter was focusing on maintaining balance as the road surface changed from tarmac to gravel

- the level crossing was not equipped with an active warning installation

- the rail bus was approaching the crossing at 120 km/h

- rail buses are silent and quite neutral coloured, which makes them difficult to see.

In order to prevent similar accidents, the investigation commission recommends that the Huikuri unprotected level crossing be removed. Furthermore, in order to improve railway safety, the investigation commission reiterates recommendation S230 of investigation report B2/2007R: The
structure of the obstruction cleaning device of Dm12 rail bus should be such that it is either formed of one piece or possible additional parts are attached sufficiently well.

Accident Investigation Board of Finland - Report B2/2008R

On Friday, 13 June 2008, at 1:50pm, a line-1 tram collided with the rear of a line-7B tram on the Mäkelänrinne stop, on Mäkelänkatu, in Helsinki. Two passengers were severely injured. A tram driver and 22 passengers were slightly injured. Several others received lesser injuries such as bruises and neck and shoulder pain and headaches caused by whip flash. The rails were not damaged and the trams remained on the rails. The rear of the line-7B tram was substantially damaged. For example, the chassis of the rearmost car was bent out of shape. The front of the line-1 tram was somewhat damaged, but after minor repairs it was temporarily operative. The damage to the trams resulted in a total cost of EUR 60,000.

The cause of the accident was that the driver of the tram approaching from behind was not able to stop the tram in time. The driver apparently tried to stop the tram via incorrect braking methods in the belief that the brakes were not working properly. The background factors were he driver’s inexperience, the possibility that the driver anticipated that the tram ahead would leave the stop earlier, and the driver’s suspicion that the brakes were not working properly and therefore the use of the incorrect braking method.

Accident Investigation Board of Finland - Report C5/2008R

On 8 June 2008 at 5.48 a.m., a turnout tamping machine was involved in an accident at the Jyväskylä railway yard, leading to the slight injury of a track foreman in the driver’s cab of the tamping machine. The accident involved the collision of a unit consisting of three Dv12 locomotives with a tamping machine involved in work. The engine driver applied the emergency brakes, but the locomotives were unable to stop in time and the front corner of the foremost locomotive collided with the left corner of the tamping machine. The force of the collision caused the right rail to collapse underneath the tamping machine.

The collision damaged the tamping machine in places including the chassis, body, automated controls, bogie and wheelsets. The foremost locomotive incurred damage on the right side of the maintenance deck and hand rails. About 20 metres of track were damaged. The total damage to track and equipment amounted to € 214,000.